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Abstract We study the optimal income taxation of couples. We determine the
resulting intra-family labor supply allocation and its implication for the choice
of the tax unit (individual versus joint taxation). We provide a general condi-
tion for full joint taxation to arise. We also study how the spouses’ respective
labor supply decisions are distorted when the condition does not hold. In
particular, we show that, depending on the pattern of mating, the celebrated
result according to which the spouse with the more elastic labor supply faces
the lower marginal tax rates may or may not hold in our setting.
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1 Introduction
The tax treatment of couples has been a heavily debated subject among
economists and noneconomists alike. Family taxation rules continue to differ
significantly across countries, even though there appears to be a trend towards
a more “individualized” tax system. It does appear that family (or couple)-
based schemes tend to be replaced by systems that rely on the individual as
the relevant tax unit. Accordingly, an individual’s tax liability depends less
than previously on the spouse’s income. This trend has been observed over
the last decades in most tax reforms in OECD countries. Nevertheless, in
some countries like France, the systems remain to a substantial part family
based.
Accounting for the family dimension when studying optimal income taxa-
tion thus appears to be highly important. Among economists, it is generally
admitted that the couple’s secondary earner is also the one with the higher
elasticity of labor supply (e.g. see Blundell and MaCurdy 1999). Following the
traditional Ramsey rule, the secondary wage earner should face a lower linear
tax (see Boskin 1975; Boskin and Sheshinski 1983). This pleads in general for a
tax unit that is based on individual incomes. However, an individual’s welfare
largely depends upon the total couple’s income. Thus, it may be desirable
to introduce a certain degree of progressivity depending upon the family’s
income.
The literature on this topic is quite scarce and restrictive. Following the
seminal paper by Boskin (1975) and Boskin and Sheshinski (1983), authors
have usually constrained the analysis of optimal family income taxation to the
framework of only linear instruments.1 As a result, the choice of the tax unit
only depends upon the difference between optimal tax rates of the primary
and the secondary earners: joint taxation is desirable if and only if these two
tax rates are equal.
In reality, the picture is however more complicated than that. The taxation
of a couple typically depends upon the primary and the secondary labor
incomes. On one extreme, there is pure joint taxation if the tax function
depends only on the sum of these two incomes. As a result, the marginal tax
rate is the same for both spouses of the same couple. On the other extreme, we
have individual taxation under which the tax paid by the family is the addition
of two tax functions each depending only upon one spouse’s income. In this
situation, the tax unit is purely based on individual incomes, but this does not,
however, preclude the case where both spouses’ marginal tax rates are equal.
Between these two polar cases, joint taxation and individual taxation, the most
1Examples are papers by Apps and Rees (1988, 1999) or more recently Kleven (2004).
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widespread system is one of selective taxation under which secondary earners,
usually women, are taxed on a separate, lower, progressive tax schedule than
that of primary earners.
The design of the tax function is often expressed in terms of the choice of the
“tax unit”: couple versus individual. Thus, joint taxation corresponds to choos-
ing the couple as the tax unit, with their combined income being the tax base
while individual and selective taxation have the individual as the tax unit and
the individual income as tax base. In this paper, we study the conditions that
lead to a joint taxation system. Our approach is in the tradition of nonlinear
optimal income taxation. We, thus, assume away some of the considerations
that can explain the observed move towards individualization of tax rules. One
of them is ethical and reflects the view that individuals should be given priority
over couples in the name of responsibility. Another one is informational:
marital status is assumed to be observable. This is a strong assumption because
we live in a world with a wide variety of living arrangement and it is not always
easy for tax authorities to sort them out. Typically, couples can pretend living
separately if they find it more attractive in terms of tax burden.
We study the optimal income taxation of couples in a nonlinear framework
(Mirrlees 1971). We examine whether the optimal (second best) allocation
distorts one spouse’s labor supply relative to that of the other’s spouse for a
given level of gross income earned by the family. This issue, in turn, is strongly
connected to the choice of tax unit. We show that pure joint taxation (with
total household income as tax base) is equivalent to having no distortion
in the allocation of both spouses’ labor supplies for a given level of family
income. We derive a general property stating if and how the intra-family
allocation of labor is distorted. We also show in more restrictive settings how
this condition can be related to the primitives of the model. We also study how
the spouses respective labor supply decisions are distorted when the condition
does not hold. In particular, we show that the celebrated result according to
which the spouse with the more elastic labor supply faces the lower marginal
tax rates may or may not hold in our setting, depending on the pattern of
mating.
Nonlinear income taxation of couple has so far not received much attention
in the literature. One exception is the paper by Schroyen (2003) who studies
optimal nonlinear income taxation in a setting where labor supply decisions are
made within the household (couple) while the tax schedule is by assumption
based on individual filing. He shows that the household structure and partic-
ularly the mating pattern affect the structure of an individual based income
tax. Another more recent contribution is provided by Brett (2007) who studies
optimal income taxes when each spouse productivities can take two values.
In other words, he considers a multidimensional screening problem with four
types of couples. As a result, optimal marginal income taxes may turn out to
be negative for some spouses. He focuses on the sign of the marginal income
taxes rather than on the relative size of the labor supply distortions in each
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couple (which is our main subject).2 Finally, Kleven et al. (2009) study a fairly
general problem of optimum taxation of two wage earners family allowing
multidimensional differences across families within a unitary model (of family
decision making). They are interested in determining whether the tax function
is separable into two individual and independent tax schedules and in the
asymptotic design of these tax functions.3
Our contribution is very much complementary to the one of Kleven et al.
(2009). These authors focus on the case where the spouses wages are indepen-
dently distributed and not surprisingly this is when separable tax functions are
most likely to occur. Our paper, to a large extent, concentrates on the case
where spouses abilities are somehow correlated. While our general condition
for joint taxation does not directly rely on any prior assumption about the two
wage distributions, the degree of correlation between spouses abilities plays a
crucial role. For instance, when both spouses have the same disutility of labor
(and the same elasticity parameter), joint taxation arises when wage ratios are
identical in all couples. When elasticities differ, on the other hand, the spouses
relative wages must obey a more complex (and nonlinear) condition to yield
joint taxation. We also study how the spouses respective labor supply decisions
are distorted when the condition does not hold. In particular, we show that,
depending on the pattern of mating, the celebrated result according to which
the spouse with the more elastic labor supply faces the lower marginal tax rates
may ormay not hold in our setting. Interestingly, while empirical estimations of
labor supply elasticities tend to favor lower marginal income taxes for married
women, the evidence on wage distribution among French dual earner couples
seems to push for higher marginal taxes for married women.
2 The model
2.1 Couples: preferences and productivities
Consider a couple composed of two individuals indexed by j = w, h. The
couple’s preferences over its net income x and labor supplies ! j ( j = w, h)
are represented by a quasi-concave family utility function U (x, !w, !h) , with
∂U/∂x > 0 and ∂U/∂! j < 0. The society is composed of N types of couples
indexed by superscript i (i = 1, . . . , N) who differ in their members’ labor
productivities aiw and a
i
h. The proportion of type i couples in the economy is
2The issue of the choice of the tax base is only briefly addressed in his Proposition 7.
3All these papers, like ours focus on the tax treatment of couples. Another issue in family taxation
is the tax treatment of children; see Cigno (1986) and Cigno and Pettini (2003).
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denoted by pii where
∑N
i=1 pii = 1. The total number of couples is normalized
at one for notational convenience.4
2.2 Tax instruments and labor supply decisions
As in traditional models of optimal taxation, we assume that the individual pro-
ductivities and labor supplies are not publicly observable. For any couple, how-
ever, before tax incomes of each of the spouses, yiw = aiw!iw and yih = aih!ih are







incomes of the two wage earners. This general tax function may exhibit some
specific properties. In reality, tax functions range from “unitary taxation” to
“separable taxation”.5 In the first case, the tax function only depends upon the





) = T˜ (yiw + yih). In the second case,
the tax levied on the income of one spouse does not depend upon the income





) = T̂ (yiw)+ T̂ (yih). As mentioned
in the introduction, much of the existing literature has concentrated on the
class of linear tax functions. The main question addressed in these papers is
whether or not the income of both spouses should be taxed at the same (mar-
ginal) tax rate. We reconsider this question with nonlinear tax instruments. In
such a setting, the issue of equal or unequal marginal tax rate within the couple
is particularly interesting because it is closely related to the issue of the choice













/∂yih, ∀i = 1, . . . , N, (1)
is a necessary condition to have a unitary taxation system. It is also sufficient in
the sense that when this condition holds for all couples, the optimal allocation
can be implemented by a unitary tax function.6
Condition (1) is particularly interesting because it implies that the tax system
does not distort the intra-family allocation of labor supply. To be more precise,
4This model of the couple is a fairly general reduced form of the unitary model. It is consistent
with the existence of “private” and “public” goods in the household and with the determination
of consumption and labor supply levels through a bargaining process (where the weights are
exogenous and not affected by the tax policy). From that perspective, one can think ofU(x, !w, !y)
as the value function associated with the problem of allocating a household budget x to the
various consumption goods, given labor supply levels !w and !y. In other words, U(x, !w, !y)
specifies the maximum level of the households objective (e.g., a weighted sum of utilities or a
Nash product) given labor supplies and given its total (after tax budget). Using this reduced form
rather than the original household objective in the optimal tax problem does not involve any
loss of generality as long as differential commodity taxation is not possible, for instance because
individual consumption levels (and thus the allocation of goods within the couple) are not publicly
observable.
5This is admittedly a highly stylized and incomplete typology. In particular, it abstracts from the
tax treatment of children and relies on the assumption that there are no single individuals.
6Which does not necessarily imply that all implementing tax functions are unitary.
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for a given level of after tax income the labor allocation between the two
spouses is not affected by such a tax function. To see this, note that for a given














s.t. x = yh + yw − T (yw, yh) . (3)
Deriving the FOC and rearranging yields





= 1− ∂T (yh, yw) /∂yh
1− ∂T (yh, yw) /∂yw . (4)
The tradeoff between yw and yh is not distorted (with respect to a first-best
and/or laissez-faire outcome) when MRSyw,yh = 1. This is of course always the
case when there are no taxes at all. More interestingly, Eq. 4 shows that the
tradeoff remains undistorted as long as ∂T (yh, yw) /∂yh = ∂T (yh, yw) /∂yw,
i.e., when the marginal tax on labor income is the same for both spouses.7
Based on the same arguments, we will say that the choice between yw and
yh is distorted towards more yh (respectively, yw) when ∂T (yh, yw) /∂yw >
∂T (yh, yw) /∂yh (respectively, ∂T (yh, yw) /∂yw < ∂T (yh, yw) /∂yh).
An alternative view on these distortions consists in saying that the choice
between yw and yh is distorted towards less yw if couples who choose to
decrease yw pay less taxes for a given level of total before tax income GI =





= ∂T (yh, yw)
∂yw
− ∂T (yh, yw)
∂yh
> 0.
3 The optimal tax function
We characterize the (constrained) Pareto efficient allocations that are ob-
tained by maximizing a weighted sum of utilities subject to the resource con-
straint and the incentive compatibility constraints. The weight of a type i
couple is denoted αipi i with αi ≥ 0 and ∑i αi = 1. For the remainder of the
7When marginal taxes are different from zero, leisure-labor and/or domestic labor-market labor
tradeoffs are distorted. However, the intra-family allocation of labor supply (as specified by
problem (2)) remains undistorted when marginal tax rates are the same for both spouses.
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. Because types are private information the following
incentive compatibility constraints apply for any i, j = 1, . . . , N,
Ui = Ui (xi, yiw, yih) ≥ Uij = Ui (x j, y jw, y jh) . (5)
In words, couple i must not be able to achieve a (strictly) larger utility level by
mimicking couple j, i.e., by consuming the consumption bundle designed for
couple j.













yiw + yih − xi
) ≥ G, (6)
Ui ≥ Uij i, j = 1.......N. (7)
where G is the exogenous revenue requirement while Ui and Uij are defined
by Eq. 5.
Denoting the multipliers of constraints (6) and (7) by µ and λij, respectively,
















The first order conditions with respect to yiw and y
i




























































−∑Nj=1 λ ji ∂U ji∂Yiw MRS jiyw,yhMRSiyw,yh
. (10)
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Combining Eq. 10 with Eq. 4 and rearranging then establishes the following
proposition; see Appendix A.
Proposition 1






























) = T˜ (yiw + yih) if and only if condition (11) holds as equality for
all couples i = 1, . . . N.
Proposition 1 provides a general condition under which a couple’s tradeoff
between the spouses’ labor supplies should not be distorted; specifically this
is true when the LHS of Eq. 11 is equal to zero. Otherwise, it ought to be
distorted and the direction of the distortion is provided by Eq. 11. When the
LHS of this condition is negative, w faces a higher marginal tax rate than h and
the tradeoff is distorted towards more yh. If it is negative, we have the opposite
result. This condition is general in the sense that it is valid whatever the pattern
of binding incentive constraints and for any welfare weights. The price to pay
for this level of generality is that the condition involves endogenous variables.
We shall show below that Eq. 11 reduces to a condition on the primitives
of the model in special cases. In those cases the interpretation will also be
facilitated. In the meantime let us have a look at the interpretation of the
general condition.
To do this, let us first compare the choices of labor supplies, (yw, yh) , by
couples i and j for a given level of gross income GI = yw + yh. Each couple
chooses a pair (yw, yh) that lies at the point of tangency between indifference
curves and the gross income line, i.e., where MRS jyw,yh =MRSiyw,yh = 1.
Figure 1 illustrates this choice in the (yh, yw) plane where couples j and i
choose a different combination of spouses’ gross incomes (labeled j and i
respectively). In the case that is depicted, the marginal rate of substitution
between yw and yh evaluated at point i is larger (in absolute value) for couple j
than for couple i, so that it chooses a higher yw and a lower yh. Now assume that
the incentive compatibility constraint preventing couple j to mimic couple i is






couple j has a steeper indifference







attractive for couple j, it is then desirable to distort the choice of couple i
towards less yw (moving to the right along the income line). In other words,
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Fig. 1 The (yw, yh) choice for
a given level of gross
income GI
a higher marginal tax on yiw would be desirable to relax an otherwise binding
incentive compatibility constraint. Alternatively, when the marginal rate of
substitution is lower (in absolute value) for couple j then it is desirable to
distort the choice of couple i towards more yw, i.e., to have a higher marginal
tax on yh. This graphical argument has a direct economic interpretation. As
long as spouses contributions to a given gross household income differ between
couples, the government can gain from observing not only the total household
income, but how this income is divided between the spouses.
So far, we have concentrated on one pair of couples. However, the solution
may well imply that several incentive constraints towards type i are binding.
Condition (11) considers all couples j for which the incentive compatibility
constraints towards the type i couple is binding, i.e., all the j such that λ ji >
0. For each binding incentive compatibility constraint, there is a desirable
distortion on the (yiw, y
i
h) choice. As argued above, the sign of this distortion
depends upon the difference between the two couples in the marginal rates of






tradeoff depends upon a weighted sum of distortions imposed by each binding
self-selection constraints in which i is the mimicked type.9
Observe that a couple i such that λ ji = 0 for all j (if it exists) never faces a
distortion (the LHS of Eq. 11) is always equal to zero). This is the counterpart
to the traditional no distortion at the top result in this multidimensional setting.
For all other types i (with at least one λ ji > 0) the LHS of Eq. 11 may or may
not be zero, depending on the marginal rates of substitution of the mimicker
and the mimicked couples. A sufficient condition for this to be the case is that






for all pairs of couples with λ ji > 0.
9This statement is related to Proposition 5 of Brito et al. (1990). In our set up, their proposition












/∂yih (respectively,<), then there exists a non empty
set of couples K ⊂ N such that for k ∈ K, λki > 0 and MRSiyw,yh < MRSkyw,yh (respectively, >).
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In words, this (sufficient) condition requires that all pairs of couples linked by
a binding incentive constraint have the same marginal rate of substitution (at
the labor supply bundle of the mimicked couple).
4 The role of labor supply elasticities
A more intuitive version of condition (11), based solely on exogenous vari-
ables, can be obtained for specific classes of utility functions. Let Pi = aiw/aih
denote the intra-household productivity gap between spouse w and spouse h
in couple i (HPG).10 The following proposition is established in Appendix B.
Proposition 2 Assume couples utility functions are of the form




























= 1 for all i, j = 1, ..., N. (13)
To interpret this result, note that βk measures the elasticity of labor supply
of spouse k = w, h. To be more precise, βk is the Frisch elasticity (also
called intertemporal elasticity of labor supply, see MaCurdy 1981), that is the
response of ! to an increase in the wage, holding marginal utility of wealth (and
thus consumption) constant.11
Assume first that the male and female labor elasticities are the same, i.e.,
βw = βh. Condition (13) for equal marginal tax rates requires that the HPG be
the same for all couples (Pi = Pj). The underlying mating pattern thus implies
a perfect correlation between the productivities of the spouse. This is an
extreme form of assortative mating which is unlikely to be observed in reality.
However, some studies suggest that couples are becoming more and more sim-
ilar over time so the correlation between spouses’ incomes increases in most
industrial societies; see e.g., Kalmijn (1994). As soon as the two labor supply
elasticities are different, having equal HPG can no longer imply equal marginal
10The ratio between spouses productivities is typically referred to a “gap” in the empirical
literature. We follow this tradition here.






where subscripts denote partial derivatives.
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income tax rates. As shown in Eq. 13, the relation between the productivity
ratio is not linear anymore.
The results obtained so far do not depend on the pattern of binding incentive
constraints. We can gain further insights, particularly pertaining to the relative
distortions of spouses labor supplies by making some additional assumption
on the distribution of wages and thus ultimately on the pattern of binding
incentive constraints. Assume now that couples i = 1...N are ordered such that




k > ... > a
1
k for k = w, h so that couple i+ 1 is richer than
couple i. With this assumption a single level of aw is associated with any given
level of ah. Put differently, we can express aw as an increasing function of ah.
This effectively reduces out problem to a single dimension of heterogeneity
and it is reasonable to assume that incentive compatibility constraints are
binding from high ability to low ability couples.12 To simplify notation suppose
further that only adjacent downward incentive compatibility constraints are
binding, i.e., that λi+1,i > 0 and λi+1, j = 0 for all i = 1...N − 1 with j &= i.13
In this case, there is no distortion for the couple of type N. Furthermore, for


















To see this, it is sufficient to replace j by i+ 1 in condition (Eq. 11) while
keeping in mind that ∂U ji/∂yiw < 0. Using the expressions for the marginal
rates of substitution derived from utility function (12), we then obtain the
following proposition.




k > ... > a
1
k for k = w, h and
that only adjacent downward incentive compatibility constraints are binding,
i.e., that λi+1,i > 0 and λi+1, j = 0 for all i = 1...N − 1 with j &= i. With isoelastic






























12With our assumption couples can be ordered by the>F relation defined by Brett (2007), and the
determination of the pattern of binding incentive constraints is dramatically simplified.
13This assumption is stronger than necessary, but it dramatically simplifies notation. All our
qualitative results go through if we assume simply that only downward incentive constraints are
binding. To see this, observe that the pairwise comparisons of MRS we perform are valid also
when j &= i+ 1. The translation into marginal tax rates is slightly more complicated because we
may have that more than one IC constraint towards a given type is binding. However, we may
recall from Eq. 11 that the total effect is obtained by adding the pairwise effects. Consequently,
when all these effects go in the same direction, the study of the pairwise effects is sufficient.
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Assume first that the two Frisch labor supply elasticities are equal, i.e.,







/∂yih. It means that the spouse w in the mimicked couple faces
a lower marginal tax rate than spouse h, when the mimicked couple has a
higher HPG. With the considered profile of the spouses productivity ratios
such a distortion has a more significant impact on the utility of the mimicking
couple than on that of the mimicked couple and, as explained in the previous
section, the differential taxation of the spouses incomes relaxes a binding
incentive constraint. Conversely, Pi < Pi+1 yields ∂T/∂yiw > ∂T/∂yih and we
have exactly the opposite result (but the same intuition).
Now assume Pi = Pi+1, but βw > βh. Condition (14) then implies that
∂T/∂yiw < ∂T/∂y
i
h. In other words, the marginal income tax is lower for the
female spouse in the low productivity couple if her elasticity of labor supply
is higher. It is interesting to note that our result vindicates studies by Boskin
(1975) and Boskin and Sheshinski (1983) who argue that the tax rate on the
spouse with the highest elasticity of labor supply should be lower. However
their argument stands on the inverse-elasticity rule in an affine taxation
framework while our result hinges on the fact that a lower marginal income
tax on one spouse mitigates an otherwise binding self-selection constraint. This
result continues to hold when HPGs are not too different. However, when the
spousew in the mimicked couple has a much lower HPG than in the mimicking
couple, the result could be reversed. To see this, note that when Pi is much
lower than Pi+1 i.e., the HPG is much lower in the poor couple) then the
ratio in the LHS of Eq. 14 may well be greater than one so that the marginal
income tax on spouse w will be higher. In this case the traditional result by
Boskin (1975) and Boskin and Sheshinski (1983) does not hold anymore: the
marginal income tax can be higher on the spouse with the higher labor supply
elasticity.
Our analysis has shed some light on the role of labor supply elasticities and
HPGs on the differential tax treatment of spouses. To illustrate the relevance
of these results, it is interesting to see what the empirical literature says about
elasticities and HPGs among married couples. In order to have good measures
of what the men and women Frisch elasticities are, one has to rely on models
of intertemporal labor supply popularized by MaCurdy (1981). Furthermore,
as suggested by Blundell et al. (1993), the Frisch elasticities estimates are
biased if extensive margin labor supply decision and marital status are not
accounted for. To the best of our knowledge, Kimmel and Kniesner (1998)
present the only study which satisfies these requirements. Their estimations
lead to Frisch intensive labor supply elasticities of 0.40 and 0.67, respectively,
for men and women belonging to a dual earner couples. In light of our results,
this evidence supports a higher marginal income tax on married men. But this
argument is based solely on the elasticity term in expression (14). Turning to
the other term, estimates based on data from the French INSEE surveyBudget
des Familles See INSEE (2000), show an elasticity of HPGs (as measured
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by the ratio of annual gross wages) with respect to the couple’s total yearly
labor income of 0.36 among dual earner couples. In other words, the HPG
appears to be an increasing and concave function of the couple’s income
so that there is less heterogeneity among richer couples. This suggest that
in expression (14) we have Pi < Pi+1 so that the HPG term implies higher
marginal tax rates for married women. To sum up, estimates of Frisch labor
supply elasticities and of the distribution of HPGs among couples provide
conflicting evidence regarding the spouses respective marginal tax rates. At
the very least, the profile of HPGs mitigates the effect of the elasticities. The
available evidence is not sufficient to determine whether it can be reversed.
Hopefully future empirical work will provide the foundation for a more precise
assessment.
5 Conclusions
Understanding the implications of optimal taxation theory for the fiscal treat-
ment of couples is a big challenge. This paper is an attempt to explore some
aspects of the problem. Specifically, we have provided a general framework
to study the intra-family labor allocation under an optimal nonlinear income
tax schedule. Whether this allocation is distorted or not depends upon the tax
unit choice. The literature distinguishes between two “tax units”: the couple
vs the individual. It also considers three tax systems: joint taxation, individual
taxation and selective taxation. The first corresponds to choosing the couple as
the tax unit while the second and the third have the individual as the tax unit.
We have provided conditions that lead to a non distorted intra-family
tradeoff and thus to a joint tax system. Not surprisingly, these conditions are
rather restrictive. For instance, when the family utility function is separable,
the labor disutility function is isoelastic and both spouses have the same labor
supply elasticity pure joint taxation arises when the ratio between the two
earners’ productivity is the same in all couples (there is perfect assortative
mating). When labor supply elasticities differ between spouses, the spouses
relative wages must obey a more complex (and nonlinear) condition to yield
joint taxation. We have also studied how the spouses respective labor supply
decisions are distorted when the condition does not hold. In particular, we
show that the celebrated result according to which the spouse with the more
elastic labor supply faces the lower marginal tax rates may or may not hold in
our setting, depending on the pattern of mating. Empirical evidence suggests
that the traditional wisdom that women should face lower marginal income
tax is challenged, or at least mitigated, by the observed mating pattern among
French couples.
It is important to note that the restrictive character of the assumptions that
imply joint taxation does not mean that the assumptions needed to obtain
separate taxation are less restrictive.
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While allowing a quite general framework, our analysis suffers from an
important drawback namely that it is based on the so-called unitary approach.
It is well known that this approach is usually not supported by the empirical
evidence. In the future, we plan to study such problems within the framework
of collective models initiated by Chiappori (1988).
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Appendix
A Proof of Proposition 1
Combining Eqs. 4 and 10 yields
1− ∂T (yih, yiw) /∂yih
































−∑Nj=1 λ ji ∂U ji∂yiw MRS jiyw,yhMRSiyw,yh
! 1. (15)
Numerator and denominator of Eq. 15 are negative. Consequently this prop-



































Simplifying and rearranging the last inequality establishes Proposition 1.
Author's personal copy
Income taxation of couples and the tax unit choice
B Proof of Proposition 2










































































Rearranging the terms and making use of the definition of Pi establishes the
proposition.
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